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The Arab State, Identity and Social Progress: Egypt, 
Globalization and the Challenges of Integration (Robert 
Bowker) 
Beware of underrating state power, but in addition give proper attention to 
social forces and processes and see how they relate to the development of 
states and world orders. (Robert Cox, 1981) 
 
 
The Arab uprisings in 2011 showed that the Middle East is changing in ways which a decade 
ago were rarely contemplated, either in the countries concerned or beyond them. However one 
factor remains constant — if Arab countries of the Middle East are to surmount the pressures 
of demography and conflicting aspirations and values in a globalizing world, the challenges of 
creative interaction transforming outmoded economic and political structures, and fostering 
adaptive societies, will have to be addressed more effectively. Success or failure on the frontiers 
between the global and the local in the Arab world will be determined in large measure by the 
quality of the relationship between Arab society and world society. If a stronger and more 
productive engagement between the two is to emerge, it will need to be joined with the process 
of transformation which is under way within the Arab world. 
 
The dynamics of globalization – taken here to mean a process making social relations ‘relatively 
delinked from territorial geography, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world 
as a single place’ (Scholte 2000, 14-15) – must be understood in the context of the interaction 
between social forces, states and the structural characteristics of a world order characterized by 
differentiation and manifest inequalities (Halliday 2002). These processes are also occurring 
amidst the exercise of national sovereignty, in both political and economic domains; 
determination on the part of Arab intellectuals to re-invigorate the culture, institutions and core 
values by which people are proud to identify themselves as Arab (Shboul 1993); and the rise of 
Islamist political and pietist movements which challenge the values, practices and policies of a 
secular, authoritarian order. 
In these socially-charged ‘zones of cultural interface and fluidity in group affiliations’ 
(Lightfoot and Martinez, 1995, 472) we have simultaneously witnessed concern to affirm the 
exercise of national sovereignty, in both political and economic domains; the emergence of a 
politically-aware, technologically and organizationally sophisticated generation of youthful 
activists for whom the barriers of fear of the repressive power of the state have finally been 
broken; and the rise of Islamist political and pietist movements which challenge the values, 
practices and policies of the secular, authoritarian order which characterized long-established 
Arab regimes.  
 
In Egypt in 2011, instead of the widely-anticipated continuation of a process of incremental 
albeit uneven reform, we saw a sudden political collapse of the regime and the beginning of a 
period of political transition whose ultimate direction is not yet established. The traditional 
political class has failed to capture the imagination and support of the younger generation of 
middle class political activists, while ‘revolutionists’ have struggled much of the time to sustain 
popular support for their causes in the absence of coherence of vision and effective political 
and communication skills; and amidst the debilitating effects of economic uncertainty on most 
Egyptians. Islamism remains a key challenge to the values by which the secular Egyptian elite 
attach themselves to a wider cosmopolitan world, but the Muslim Brotherhood, not the secular 
parties, has emerged as the dominant force in Egyptian politics. There has also been a rapid 
growth of the salafist phenomenon, amidst signs of social breakdown, ranging from the 
behaviour of football supporters (Lindsey, 2011) to the flouting of law by street hawkers.   
 
The two decades leading to 2011 had seen the intensification of a highly varied, eclectic and 
opportunistic interaction, not only between Arab society and world society, but also within Arab 
societies and indeed within Arab governments across the boundaries of these supposedly 
separate spheres. Arab states, including Egypt, have been instrumental in restructuring national 
economies to improve their responsiveness to the demands and disciplines of the global 
economy. Moreover, the Arab experience was not merely a process whereby cultural and 
economic colonists from the developed Western core dominated and innovated, while the less 
fortunate in the Arab world periphery remained mere passive recipients or victims of various 
forms of intellectual, economic and strategic hegemony. Instead, there is ample evidence of 
determination on the part of Arab intellectuals to re-invigorate the culture, institutions and core 
values by which people are proud to identify themselves as Arab (Shboul 1993). 
 
Identity has a range of meanings in the Arab world, and the impact of globalization depends on 
context, national and individual circumstances (Nye and Keohane, 2000). National identity 
provides a platform for the promotion and preservation, by the state and its agents, of specific 
sets of values. Tribal, religious and other sectarian demarcations remain influential, of course, 
and are often subversive to the power of the state, especially in times of heightened social and 
political stress. But for more than half a century national institutions, which range from 
education systems to armed forces to presidents, and from flags to anthems and national football 
teams, have routinized and afforded primacy to the identity and values of the state in the minds 
of its citizens. For the overwhelming majority of Arabs, the notion of a geographically delimited 
and formally institutionalized national identity is consistent, at an individual level, with a desire 
to be ‘modern’ as well as Arab and, in a growing number of cases, self-consciously Muslim. 
That makes the relationship between state and society an appropriate (but by no means the only) 
entry point for analysis of the impact of globalization on Arab identity and political, economic 
and social behaviour, and for discussion of the relationship between the Egyptian uprising and 
Egypt’s place in a globalizing world.  
That the performance of Arab states in responding to contemporary challenges up to the end of 
the first decade of this century fell far short of popular Arab expectations is hardly in dispute. 
One of the most important and controversial aspects of the critical Arab self-analysis in the 
Arab Human Development Report series (UNDP 2002-2009) was a painfully direct focus on 
the shortcomings in performance of the Arab state as an agent of positive change at a time of 
looming and unprecedented social crisis (see here also the analysis of Hatem in this volume). 
The status of military and security elites is under increasing pressure in the eyes of a small but 
increasingly vocal, technologically sophisticated and globally networked civil society.  
 
However even if it were true, as Fouad Ajami once claimed, that we are witnessing “a great 
unsettling of things, a deep Arab malady” (Ajami 1998, 3) we are seeing, at this point, a crisis 
within certain Arab countries facing a globalizing world, not a crisis of the Arab state or the 
Arab system. The Arab intellectuals’ call in the Human Development Report series was for 
reform of archaic practices, values and preserved privilege embedded in the institutions of the 
state. But neither they, nor the political activists now at the forefront of the uprisings, nor the 
political forces which are emerging from the ashes of the fallen regimes have offered an 
alternative to the state system. Nor have they envisaged any instrument for change and reform 
superior to that of the Arab state itself. The fact the Arab world was ‘richer than it (was) 
developed’, the 2002 report argued, was not due to a lack of resources, but rather to ‘deep-
rooted shortcomings in the Arab institutional structure’ (UNDP 2002). Rectification of that 
structure, rather than its removal, remains the primary focus. 
The past decade also saw the end of effective control by Arab regimes over popular access to 
external sources of information and public political discourse. In addition to the media 
revolution, Fred Halliday has pointed out the importance of emulative linkages, imitation and 
competition at certain levels within the region, as well as certain contrary tendencies toward 
differentiation (Halliday 2005, 2002). Moreover, the ‘influence of example, … personal 
influence and … money, as well as the shaping of expectations of elites and a common political 
language’ (Halliday 2005, 39) suggests that, over time, there may be greater convergence 
between on one hand the values of states and societies in the Arab Middle East, and on the other 
hand those values which are fostered by the states, societies and institutions which have global 
reach, thereby underlining the necessity to focus on the encompassing social horizon of world 
society into which also Middle East politics and society are coherently embedded (see 
introduction by Stetter in this volume) . However other boundaries to globalization – notably 
the cultural, intellectual and political factors moulding the clay of collective and individual 
Arab identities – are changing at a much slower rate than the factors mentioned above thus 
highlighting the dynamic interplay between the two theoretical poles referred to by Stephan 
Stetter in the introduction. 
Against that background, and recognizing that globalization is a complex and multidimensional 
process of, what Andreas Wimmer has called simultaneous ‘isomorphization and 
heteromorphization in an interconnected world’ (see also Stetter 2008: 24), the aim of the 
discussion which follows is to consider the role of the Arab state in shaping the social forces 
and processes through which globalization (in the sense defined above) and the Arab system 
encounter each other. The discussion will seek to provide, by referring to the Egyptian 
experience, a more nuanced understanding of the place of the state among the many factors, 
including globalization and revolution, affecting the creation, transformation and syncretisation 
of new social and cultural constructs which will shape the Arab outlook over the coming decade. 
Conceptual framework: horizontal and vertical integration 
For all its inadequacies, some of which are mentioned below, an approach which focuses on 
axes of integration provides a rudimentary analytical framework, in conjunction with a 
discussion of the role of the state, which helps to identify, in very broad terms, some of the 
dynamics at work in the encounter of Arab societies with the globalized world. To be effective 
at a national level – as a society and as a state - in a globalizing environment requires relatively 
advanced performance in terms of what may be referred to as horizontal and vertical integration. 
By horizontal integration is meant the extent to which societies prove responsive to externally-
generated or imposed ideas, values, information and images, something which may be broadly 
assessed by considering the role of communications, media, education, civil society and other 
forms of networking in the transmission of ideas and values across national borders. By vertical 
integration is meant the level of social and political cohesion and communication within Arab 
society itself, including in response to externally-generated influences. 
The distinction between the two axes is of course far from clear cut, and may reasonably be 
criticized if carried too far. Generational, gender, education, class and other gaps inevitably 
generate differing perceptions and responses within particular societies to changing ideas and 
values, including ideas originating externally. Nor can one necessarily categorize some 
influences as mostly externally-generated or home-grown. In the Arab world Islamist figures 
ranging from Yusuf Qaradawi to Amr Khaled, and pietist salafist preachers from the Gulf states 
exercise considerable appeal and moral authority across national boundaries. Arab entertainers 
such as Egypt’s Amr Diab and Lebanese divas such as Elissa, Nancy Ajram and Haifa Wehbe 
promoted on cable television networks across the region; sports personalities; film and 
television stars and other role models have a strong influence over popular perceptions of 
fashion, values and even romance. Some audiences may be influenced by, or strongly approve 
of, external role models, both Arab and western. Others may see them as reflecting precisely 
the values and lifestyles which should be avoided by those seeking to emulate the faith and 
practices of their ancestors. 
The importance of vertical integration is also easily over-stated, since non-Arab countries which 
are relatively advanced in terms of global competitiveness and effectiveness often nevertheless 
display considerable internal friction and division along class, racial and religious lines. And 
while opinion polling may suggest high levels of support for certain notions or values at a 
general or unspecific level (Rutherford 2008; Silatech 2009), there may nevertheless be 
significant gaps between Arab societies and western societies (just as such differences may 
exist within those societies themselves) concerning the meaning of such contested values as 
freedom, justice and democracy. 
However the two axes do provide an analytical portal into the nature of the challenge facing 
Egyptian society in its engagement with the wider world. Consumerism, for example, affects 
both horizontal and vertical axes. For the vast majority of young Egyptians with significant 
disposable incomes, growing expenditure on lifestyle products and amenities is an affirmation 
of social status, fashionability at a global as well as local level, and a degree of personal 
fulfilment and comfort. As a cursory glance at the advertising billboards between Cairo airport 
and downtown reveals, the imagery which surrounds the competitive branding of similar 
products, ranging from foodstuffs to mobile phones to real estate developments is strongly 
cosmopolitan in its values. While presumably intended to target a wide spectrum of Egyptian 
society, there is almost no hijab anywhere to be seen in those advertisements, let alone the full 
face veils (niqab) increasingly worn in urban centres.  
 
The impact of consumerism on vertical integration is much harder to estimate. There is, of 
course, a risk of considering, for historical reasons, vertical integration as mostly a process 
driven from the top down, and overlooking pressures building from below for change which 
may be expected to become more evident during the decade ahead. But at this juncture, while 
the gated housing communities advertised (in English) along main roads of Cairo are, at least 
to outsiders, a confronting confirmation of growing social and economic divisions in Egypt, 
they are not a driver of political mobilization. The uprising of January 2011 was firmly focussed 
on the political objective of regime change, not on issues of income distribution. And despite 
the excitement generated by the removal of the Mubarak regime, if the substantial numbers of 
Egyptians who shop in western-style supermarkets are any guide to the political values of those 
who live in such communities, those aspirations seem clearly directed, for now, towards 
maintaining lifestyles of growing consumer comfort in which politics play little obvious part. 
The Egyptian State and the Mediation of Change 
In the case of Egypt, and for most Arab Middle East countries, the concept of ‘the state’ has 
many facets, and incorporates important ambiguities. First, although it encompasses the formal 
institutions of government – a powerful executive authority, as well as cabinet ministers, 
legislative and judicial systems, and extensive bureaucracy, military and security services – the 
informal and non-transparent, non-accountable networks of power and privilege existing 
alongside its formal frameworks are the more powerful in the determination of policy (Bowker 
2010). 
Second, although the Mubarak regime was successfully challenged by the determination of 
reform-minded elements within both formal and informal networks to bring political change 
about, the systemic character of the state remains underpinned by a complex mixture of social 
values, pedagogy, popular mythologies and, in many cases, fear of the new or scepticism about 
the possibility — or desirability — of transformative change. Although it may be criticized for 
doing too little, too late, to respond to changing demographic and other circumstances, the fact 
that the Egyptian state remains strong is evidence of a process of adaptation and renewal that, 
for all its real and alleged shortcomings, has nevertheless allowed the Egyptian system to avoid 
atrophy or collapse. 
 
The processes by which Egyptian society and world society engage each other – horizontal 
integration – encompass values and modes of behaviour which are sometimes shaped by the 
state. But while one may see the Egyptian state as an important mediator of the globalization 
process, including as a facilitator of horizontal and vertical integration, as discussed below, it 
mostly undertakes that role as a preserver of privilege, while also promoting procedural, though 
not usually transformative, reforms (Ottaway and Dunne 2007; Tripp 2000). Moreover, the state 
often lacks coherence in its approach. Tensions between the agendas of different agencies of 
the state are commonplace – notably between those whose concerns for national security cause 
them to be wary of economic and political reforms, especially those reforms fostered under 
external pressure which they fear may erode social stability; those for whom ongoing economic, 
and at least in the longer term, political, reform is a priority, and those who are more willing to 
accede to calls to root out and apply transitional justice to all elements of the former regime 
associated with the abuse or perceived misuse of power in various forms.  
 
In the post-Mubarak era, we may expect to see elements of the state continuing to use their 
authority to interpret, coerce, encourage or criticize in order to subvert as well as nurture reform. 
The former regime was adept at formally promulgating certain values (such as the introduction 
of presidential elections) while limiting their application in substance (including, in regard to 
those elections, the use of constitutional devices to prevent the emergence of credible opposition 
candidates). The interests of the privileged secular elite, long determined to exclude Islamists 
from legitimate political life, have helped preserve a predominant role for the security services 
within the overall state apparatus. And in some areas corruption and bureaucratic lethargy have 
impeded the introduction of specific reforms, or distorted their effect (Sfakianakis 2004) even 
when certain measures may be deemed by relevant ministers to be a priority for government 
action. 
Considered from a vertical axis perspective, limited integration within Egyptian society 
between leaders, middle class and popular society; and a tendency among the popular audience 
to see reformists as western-oriented have also helped to produce varying responses to state-led 
initiatives to meet the pressures and opportunities of globalization, a process described by 
Egyptian scholar Ibrahim Karawan as more feared than welcomed in the region as a whole 
(Yaphe 2002: 6). Indeed ambitions on the part of the state to be part of that process, as a 
mediator or as an arbiter, together with the strength of informal networks in defending privilege 
and resisting change has often produced strong resistance to reform at the societal level. 
Hostility among Egyptian salon society towards economic reform is especially strong when it 
is perceived to come with an undisclosed agenda of forcing a marginalized, politically 
weakened and morally compromised Egypt to accept and deal with Israel – still seen by many 
in the region as the embodiment of Arab humiliation – as a legitimate part of the region. And 
because the boundaries between the Egyptian state and Egyptian society are blurred, with both 
possessing characteristics which are both authoritarian and chaotic; and because Egyptian 
society is strongly stratified, with weak internal communication, the capacity of the state to 
generate sustained, systemic-level political support for change is severely constrained. 
Meanwhile there is abundant evidence in Egypt of the determination of the established system 
to defend itself, during the process of economic reform, from pressures for transparency, 
accountability and political reform (Heydemann 2004; Sfakianakis 2004). 
Viewed along both horizontal and vertical axes at this juncture, therefore, the importance of 
national identity, and the values by which Egyptians position themselves in the state-centred, 
authoritarian and hierarchical realm of everyday existence means that Egypt does not lend itself 
readily to characterization, following John Burton, as a participant in a ‘globalized cobweb’ of 
social relations which constitutes ‘de-territorialized [space] on the basis of ‘cultural, religious, 
ethnic and ideological ties’’ (Stetter 2008: 18). Nor does the emergence of such phenomena as 
the new Arab media (Lynch 2006) necessarily inculcate in the Egyptian public sphere a sense 
of commonality and opportunity, or more nuanced understanding of differences likely to favor 
the emergence of a liberal political environment more consistent with the normative values 
generally associated with globalization (Sakr 2001). The receptivity of Egyptian society as a 
whole to the challenges and opportunities arising from globalization — including in the post-
uprising situation — varies according to the prevailing interests and perceptual predispositions 
of different layers and segments of that society. 
Even in terms of Egyptian perceptions of Egypt’s appropriate place among Arab countries, the 
notion of deterritorialized identity and interdependence associated with globalization pales in 
comparison to particularistic notions of Egyptian national identity – despite the presence in 
Cairo of the headquarters of the Arab League, which was created partly with a view to 
surmounting such rivalries and divisions. Beyond a somewhat oppositional sense of shared 
Arab identity, in which young Egyptians are increasingly aware of themselves ‘as distinctly 
Arabs in the global context’ (Yamani 2000; 2002); and more recently, in terms of the inspiration 
derived from uprisings elsewhere in the region, it is only in some specific respects – notably in 
regard to the global networking of certain streams within Islamism, and among some elements 
of the modern middle class – that there is arguably much sign of being, or wanting to become, 
part of a wider regional, let alone a non-Arab global network. 
Below the most abstract levels of generality (language, religion, relatively wide aversion to 
Israel) and perhaps the shared experiences and aspirations of those engaged in struggles to 
overthrow their own regimes, there is more to divide Egyptians from other Arabs than to unite 
them. Once a natural defense against post-colonial anxiety (see Bilgin in this volume), and still 
a potent albeit declining political value in some quarters, the societal and political importance 
of nationalism at a pan-Arab or regional level has been waning in Egypt since 1967. Its decline 
was significantly hastened by the ruptures in Arab politics which followed the Egypt-Israel 
peace treaty of 1979 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Despite the ongoing pan-Arab 
symbolic significance of the Palestinian issue, at popular levels attitudes to the Palestinians vary 
widely. And in place of pan-Arabism one can observe heightened levels of Egyptian national 
sentiment, exaggerated in some instances – such as the extraordinary antipathy generated by 
crowd behaviour surrounding football matches between Egypt and Algeria in November 2009 
and Egypt and Tunisia in March 2011 — and the parochialism of populist political figures and 
audiences alike. 
Within Egyptian society economic, social and political gaps are widening. Egypt is witnessing 
an accelerating process of segmentation – between those living in what they would regard as a 
traditional Arab Islamic milieu and those who regard themselves as both Arab and ‘modern’; 
between those who are part of a state-sponsored economy and those who are associated with a 
capitalist middle class; and between secular and Islamist elements. The fragmentation which 
that process produces is adding a layer of complexity to more traditional, but highly resilient 
divisions based on social stratification.  
The capacity of the state to direct change would be stronger if it were prepared to apply the full 
force of its legal and political authority to back its policy decisions. But for the reasons 
mentioned earlier, reform – especially reform driven by concern to be an effective part of a 
globalized world – is problematic political and social terrain. In navigating along that path, 
seeking ways to cross the social and cultural frontiers between Egyptian society and the 
globalized world without effective redistributive mechanisms for the financial rewards 
generated by economic reform policies, and without credible concern for social justice being 
reflected in government policies and the behaviour of its agencies, the legitimacy and authority 
of the state has suffered. 
However even without inculcating – at least to any significant degree – a sense of collective 
popular identity transcending jurisdictional barriers and national sovereignty, it is also true that 
the horizontal axis of globalization is affecting Egypt’s economic, social, cultural and 
behavioral processes. The processes of engagement with world society are not necessarily 
bounded completely by considerations of national identity, political rivalries and disputes, or 
by the power of the state and its agencies to obstruct or to facilitate such engagement. 
Adaptation and innovative behaviour, usually beyond the controls of government and other 
traditional forms of authority, have fostered eclectic and pragmatic choices concerning 
lifestyles, consumer tastes, population movements, employment and education. 
Demographic pressures measured in terms of graduate unemployment, rising levels of 
education, health and literacy, and the political marginalization of most of the population 
represent a significant long term challenge to the privileged Egyptian elite. Globalization has 
strengthened the capacity of the state to contain such pressures, through more effective 
surveillance and control over individuals and organizations deemed to be a security or political 
risk (Alterman 2009). But whatever the political character of the Egyptian regime may become, 
the key to managing the demographic challenge, and the environmental pressures which will 
grow over coming decades, will be the success or otherwise of government-instituted economic 
reforms underpinning economic growth and employment opportunities, especially for the 
growing number of unemployed graduates of secondary colleges and universities. On that score, 
Egyptian policy makers face a limited range of choices when it comes to protecting and 
promoting their country’s economic interests under conditions of intensified global competition 
and interdependence. 
The demographic, educational, generational and other factors promoting change may be 
marginal in their effects on the wider scheme of things at this moment, but the process is very 
hard to resist or reverse. And that will have implications for the sustainability of authoritarian 
values displayed at familial and societal levels which have long tended to privilege 
predictability, continuity and social solidarity or control ahead of individual freedom, creativity 
and intellectual inquiry. Over time, in conjunction with rising levels of education, literacy, 
female employment, generational changes and the subversive pleasure of the internet have the 
potential to redefine the patriarchal values which have shaped Egyptian society and sustained 
its political character. 
 
In combination, those factors are already loosening Egypt’s social rivets. prior to the 2011 
uprising. Advances in technology are bringing a good deal of ambiguity, contradiction and 
moral confusion among an increasingly internet-savvy generation of young Egyptians seeking 
to adapt that technology to suit social purposes and, in some cases, to circumvent social taboos 
(Eltahawy 2009). The rapid increase in the number of internet users in Egypt, for example, from 
650,000 in 2000 to 9.1 million in 2008, has been accompanied by the rise of ‘virtual 
relationships’ as a means of steering around restrictions on social contact between males and 
females. Eighty-two per cent of Egyptian internet users surveyed by the Egyptian Cabinet 
Information and Decision Support Center (IDSCC) in 2009 said they believed such 
relationships were ‘deceitful’ – but half of them reportedly admitted to having at least one 
(Daily News Egypt 3 November 2009). 
The first decade of the 21st century also saw a new, globally-oriented economy and patterns of 
behaviour in business, government and culture developing alongside, rather than in opposition 
to, those elements of Egyptian society which have remained more traditional in their values and 
behaviour. Elements of the Egyptian economy – the commercial agricultural, food processing, 
vehicle parts and garments manufacturing sectors are good examples – have become more 
globally integrated and competitive. The economic dynamism of the Gulf economies, and closer 
economic engagement by Egypt with the US and EU had a positive impact, not only in terms 
of investment flows and the introduction of new technologies, but also in terms of employment 
and empowerment of the generation of Egyptians now entering the workforce. 
Nor was the state a passive actor in this process. There was a rising degree of responsiveness to 
the requirements of modern financial and business environments, even if there remained a long 
way to go in terms of transparency and accountability and delivering the benefits of reform 
across their communities as a whole. The reforms introduced to date have served to preserve 
the privileges of the elite, who were best placed to garner the business opportunities and other 
benefits which arose for well-connected individuals from the reform process. Elite business 
circles were the first to benefit from the deregulation and other reform initiatives that provided 
a powerful stimulus to investment and business growth (World Bank 2007).  
 
It should be mentioned however that by the end of the last decade there was also, in better-
informed and reflective Egyptian political circles, a growing realization that the extent to which 
reform processes and measures supported popular notions of social justice and sought to combat 
corruption — or failed to do so — would determine popular perceptions of both the government 
and the reform programs alike. In private, senior National Democratic Party figures and civil 
society activists were willing to acknowledge that failure on that score would accentuate the 
tendency for alienated Egyptian youth to turn away from established political structures that 
offered little scope for addressing their needs, and to seek solace elsewhere. Prior to the 
uprising, there was increasing concern within some elements of the Egyptian government about 
the wisdom of economic reforms — such as the proposed encashment of food subsidies — 
whose negative political impact would be very difficult to manage. 
 
In the coming decade, especially in the fluid political environment since the fall of the old 
regime, there remains the larger problem, in the context of the challenges of vertical integration 
of Egyptian society, of how to make an organic connection between institutions and wider 
populations lacking credible leaderships and role models. In a theoretical sense, popular 
empowerment through political liberalization might open up opportunities for debate and 
persuasion of sceptical audiences about the benefits of reform and accommodation to global 
standards of behaviour. But in the absence of effective political leadership and communication 
the capacity of reformers to overcome the suspicions they generate about their objectives, 
including within the elite and the middle class, and among the wider audience, is limited. For 
the reasons mentioned earlier, reformers are more likely to be regarded, especially by audiences 
insecure about their place in a globalizing world and feeling vulnerable to external forces, as 
part of a global, western-oriented network, rather than representing a core part of a progressive 
Arab social and political structure (Fuller and Lesser 1995). 
In addition to the concerns mentioned above empowerment necessarily enters the domain of 
societal and political values. Persuading people to speak one language – of reformist vision and 
democratization – is not the same as getting them to act accordingly, especially where there is 
genuine concern about the political and security contexts in which reform is pursued. Over the 
past decade significant progress has been achieved in Egypt in terms of overhauling such areas 
of government regulation as taxation, customs administration, business registration and the 
opening up of a statist economy to private (usually externally-backed) investment, notably in 
such areas as banking, telecommunications and real estate development. The Egyptian 
government has gradually wound back unsustainable subsidies on fuel, and explored ways of 
enabling and requiring state-owned enterprises to modernize and, through exposure to 
competition, in such areas as flour milling, to become more efficient. But the economic reform 
process places the state in the horns of a dilemma. 
Insecurity is both an outcome of modernization and a normative component of that process. 
Without a constant process of challenge to existing institutions there can be no social or 
economic progress. It fell to the Egyptian state to manage and to channel productively the 
energy, anxieties and tensions that were generated accordingly. But as state-led economic 
reform in Egypt accentuated such insecurity at individual, familial and societal levels. But as 
differentials widened between the population at large and the privileged few who were the 
primary beneficiaries of the economic reform process, especially from 2004 until January 2011 
under the Nazeef government, resistance to such reforms rose. The most visible results were 
fairly low-key labour disputes over employment conditions in privatized factories (New York 
Times 28 April 2010). There was also a noticeable increase in public anxieties about 
environmental issues and job security (CBC News 2008). But perhaps of greater long term 
significance was the growing trend within popular Egyptian culture towards pietist salafism, 
rejecting the normative environment of the secular Arab state, and drawing on horizontal 
linkages to like-minded, non-state actors elsewhere, especially in the Gulf, for guidance and 
support (Brooke 2009). 
Under pressure from the secular regime and from within its own ranks, the future political and 
social direction of the Islamist movement in Egypt – or more correctly, movements, as there 
are significant differences among them (Rashwan 2009) – is— remains uncertain (Hamzawy 
2007, 2008). In some ways, the modernist Islamist trend is serving to affirm positive views of 
rights of women to study, work and explore their creative potential (Kandiyoti 1997). Its 
emphasis on ethical standards and social justice, its condemnation of corruption and its rejection 
of compromise with or concessions to Israel set it apart, at least in the popular imagination, 
from its secular counterpart. But the momentum of the movement, as well as the regional 
political outlook, favours its conservative and pietist strands rather than its more liberal and 
progressive elements.  
Among those Islamists preoccupied with doctrinal concerns at the expense of concern for 
common humanity and social progress, it is not possible to discern a desire for creative 
approaches to bridging the gaps between their values and those they hold to be in error (Faruqi 
2008; Khader 2010). To the extent that the views of pietists and conservatives within the 
education system, in the mosques and on the street constrain reform and creativity, especially 
in education and the arts, and hinder directly or indirectly the empowerment of women and the 
emergence of a critically-aware and politically potent civil society, they complicate the reform 
process and limit the capacity of Egyptians to engage effectively in world society. 
There has however been considerable reluctance, both on the part of the Egyptian state and 
within the informal networks of power and obligation within which government is embedded, 
to confront the salafist issue in a systematic and committed way. In the Mubarak era apolitical 
salafists provided a pietist counterweight to the politically engaged Islamists who the Egyptian 
leadership and security services saw as their primary concern. And from a systemic perspective, 
to reduce the popular appeal of the salafist movement would require unprecedented economic, 
political and social empowerment of ordinary Egyptians by the state, in order to give its citizens 
a sense of participation in and ownership of decisions which affect them. That process has 
begun, with the uprising of 2011, but it has a long way yet to go. 
 
A key question is whether the political uprising in Egypt will bring about changes in the ongoing 
restrictions on opportunities for employment and lifestyle choices, as well as ending the 
political frustrations that together were producing ever-greater introversion and exclusion of 
other versions of reality or contrary values among young Egyptians. The absence of such 
empowerment made it difficult for the state to counter the appeal of salafism to educated but 
marginalized people who, experiencing a sense of powerlessness and humiliation at home and 
perceiving it abroad, found increasingly attractive the values and role models which challenged 
that system. For the socially and politically marginalized, political Islam in its more 
conservative forms may be lacking concern for common humanity and social progress, but it 
reaffirmed their sense of worth and dignity, both as individuals and collectively as part of the 
Muslim umma. 
Even in relatively enlightened Islamist and secular circles in Egypt and elsewhere, while each 
have difficulty enunciating what it means to be both ‘Arab’ and ‘modern’ in a globalizing world 
they nevertheless draw their identity to a significant extent from a sense of antipathy towards 
the values of the other. To the secular Egyptian elite, the headscarf and veil symbolize the 
rejection of the cosmopolitan values of their social stratum by which they attach themselves to 
the wider world. It is a concern reinforced by regional developments, especially in regard to 
Iran, and apprehension at the impact of salafist thinking, emanating from the Gulf states and 
increasingly generated from within Egyptian society. Both secularists and Islamists have 
adapted, moreover, to living with their primordial and interests-based differences within the 
framework of an authoritarian state. Empowerment threatens established bastions of authority 
and privilege, whether they are located within the ruling secular elite or within the Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
Bringing together the secular and Islamists streams in ways which both sides see as providing 
a reasonable basis for enduring commitment to the institutions of the state, and empowering 
both while guaranteeing respect for the differing values they represent, poses major challenges. 
Communication across what are, in effect, cultural as well as political frontier zones would need 
to encompass an effective dialogue on such concerns as gender relations; patriarchal privilege; 
education standards and pedagogy; core values including attitudes to influence-brokering and 
corruption; religious identity and cultural authenticity, and notions of political legitimacy and 
leadership. Although the common experience of the uprising brought many secular and Islamist 
Egyptians to appreciate the degree to which they shared interests, if not perspectives, on 
political and social issues, reshaping Egyptian society in ways which will support democratic 
constitutionalism and inclusiveness as core values demands a level of understanding and mutual 
respect that does not exist at present across most of the population.   
Outlook: the politics of changing social dynamics in Egypt 
The population of Egypt is projected to rise from 65 million in 2000 to around 130 million by 
2050 (US Census Bureau 2009), amidst growing environmental pressures, and significant 
pressure to respond to the unmet expectations of an increasingly educated, technologically 
adept, organizationally-capable political audience. Because they ultimately have no choice but 
to meet the challenges posed by demographic and other pressures, Egypt and other Arab Middle 
East countries will increasingly be part of a globalizing world. But the tasks of meeting the 
challenge at the social, political, economic and cultural frontiers of horizontal integration – 
effective participation in global and national economic and political institutions and activities 
– and achieving greater vertical integration among the components and layers of Egyptian 
society raises significant issues. 
 
Political reform will be critical to the success of Egypt’s ongoing engagement with a globalizing 
world. Authoritarian rule in Egypt served ultimately to highlight the connection between 
political dysfunction and the problems of achieving human development. Regulatory reform, 
which only the state can conduct, is continuously required; and effective participation in its 
decision-making processes will be necessary if those reforms are to take root. According 
priority to global economic competitiveness, efficiency, real cost charging and individual 
creativity and profit maximization can only be at the expense of traditional values, and as such 
changes will have political consequences, not only for the institutions of the state but also for 
families and individuals, a balance has to be achieved between politics, social contract concerns 
including demands for economic and social justice, and economic pressures. Failure to find 
means to give effective political expression not only to demands for empowerment but also to 
popular anxieties arising from that process represents a key risk area for Egypt over the coming 
decade. 
There is also a significant risk that if the political reform process which was launched in 2011 
does not result in due course in a fully-fledged civilian government, or if the process otherwise 
loses its momentum toward popular empowerment, the existing Egyptian business elite will 
continue to engorge themselves upon its short term rewards and benefits of economic reform. 
It is capable of doing so to the point where the sustainability of the system itself may be called 
into question. Only a strong, confident, innovative, globally-connected and competitive 
Egyptian private sector, backed by a government which has the strong support of the 
international financial and political community and which enjoys a considerable measure of 
popular authority and respect can deliver the outcomes that Egyptians need.  
For the moment, the factors in Egypt standing in the way of continuing with economic reform 
are primarily political and organizational. Resistance to transformative-level reform probably 
has more to do with the protection of the privileged and the comfort of the familiar than the 
contested demands of Islam and Islamists, or the weakness of the linkages between the 
reformists and their wider society, or the uncertainties of the regional political and security 
outlook. But ultimately the sustainability of reform policies will be determined by the degree 
to which those policies and the values underpinning them are grown from below, rather than 
imposed from above. Political reform which exposes both secular and Islamist streams to the 
rigours of political accountability in the post-uprising environment, and which gives citizens a 
sense of participation in decisions affecting their lives will be a necessary part of that process. 
Key indicators of whether Egypt is making progress in that regard include the extent to which 
there is a shift from a culture of protection and control to a culture which empowers and rewards 
initiative. The successful pursuit of reform will entail the provision of social safety nets and 
redistributive mechanisms, and greater concern than was shown under Mubarak for business 
regulation and effective environmental management as part of the exposure of the economy to 
the global marketplace. It risks heightened resistance where it neglects the need to protect and 
consult meaningfully with the most marginalized and vulnerable of citizens. 
Perhaps the most critical question is whether the Egyptian state, through a conscious and 
deliberate process of social empowerment alongside its search for political empowerment, will 
add to the pool of creativity and energy now at its disposal. Managing the challenges posed by 
political Islam and addressing gaps between secular and Islamist perceptions, and strengthening 
the connections between Arab and world society will require strong communication skills and 
political vision. There are risks attached to harnessing the energies and ambitions of educated 
youth, not only for existing bastions of privilege, both in government and in family circles, but 
also for those elements in government bureaucracies which have carved out their own areas of 
relative comfort under the authoritarian umbrella of the old regime.  
 
Egypt’s leaders therefore face difficult political decisions if they are to capture effectively the 
potential for progress in a globalizing environment. But for Egypt to capitalise fully on the 
opportunities now before it, while preserving the Arab identity and dignity of its people, a 
process has to develop which balances both economic and ongoing political reforms. If those 
reforms are not forthcoming, we may expect to see globalization strengthening trends in Egypt 
toward regressive thinking and values, especially among those who, feeling marginalized from 
the society at large, choose to develop their identity in those unwelcome directions. 
Conclusion 
The frontiers between the global and the local in Egypt, and in the Arab world in general, 
represent multidimensional, fluid and highly charged political and social terrain. Even when 
viewed from rather state-centric perspectives, globalization in the Arab Middle East context 
provides evidence of the power of ideas and values to affect national goals and policies; to 
influence notions of individual and collective identity and attitudes to change at government 
and popular levels, and to shape the behaviour of the state as a mediator of those processes. 
They give rise to complex interactions between elites, and between governments and audiences, 
in responding to pressures across those boundaries for change. The outcomes of those 
interactions will determine the identities, values and outlook for Egyptians as well as the wider 
Arab outlook over the coming decade. 
 
The processes through which Egyptian society is engaging with world society highlight the 
social and political challenges facing the state if it fails to respond to the needs of changing 
circumstances. It has also been suggested that while the state has been a key influence in 
determining the nature and timing of reforms in areas within the government domain, different 
components or institutions within the state have pursued their particular agendas – both 
progressive and conservative – in the course of that engagement. The results, accordingly, have 
been mixed. 
In the case of Egypt, the state has been a primary means by which the ambitions of reformists 
to bring about social progress are adapted and delivered, notably in bringing processes of 
financial and regulatory authority into line with international practice, and building a 
sustainable platform for further enhancement of the business environment. But in some areas – 
notably in the political arena – informal institutions and networks operating within the state, 
and outside it, have also played a role in providing resistance to change. Until the uprising of 
January 2011, political stasis and corruption, and a growing trend within popular Egyptian 
culture towards pietist salafism were threatening the capacity of reformists to advance solutions 
to the challenges they appreciated Egypt needed to overcome.     
Demographic realities, education, communications technology and other factors have left 
Egyptian governments without viable alternatives to the pursuit of economic reform. However 
those who see globalization as an unstoppable process, in the Egyptian context at least, 
downplay the significance of countervailing factors at their peril. Since the fall of the Mubarak 
regime there has been understandable concern within Egypt and abroad about the open-ended 
nature of reform, and the potential for it to produce unintended consequences for the political 
stability and internal security of the country. Though they rejoiced at Mubarak’s fall, Egyptians 
in general are conservative, remarkably good at adapting to political and economic 
dysfunctionality, and wary of changes from the familiar. The privileges entrenched by the 
former elite and accruing to favoured parts of the middle class, and the special status of 
members of the military and those bureaucrats who enjoyed exceptional access to opportunity 
within the process of government are not about to be readily surrendered by those parties either.  
The Egyptian case, and the tumultuous events of 2011 remind us that study of globalization is 
best undertaken in a way which accords consideration to its integrative and disintegrative social 
consequences. In the Arab context, it highlights the agency of the state, as well as the state’s 
tendency towards structural immobility. If that seems anomalous, it is merely a reflection of the 
ambiguities and tensions within Egyptian society, as indeed exist in most Arab countries facing, 
like Egypt, a future pregnant with possibilities. 
 
